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HUGO GROTIUS, HOSTI HUMANI GENERIS, AND THE
NATURAL LAW IN TIME OF WAR
Peter Judson Richardst
I. INTRODUCTION
As Protestants seek for theorists who can serve as able guides for thinking
about the natural law, the figure of Hugo Grotius deserves serious attention.
Grotius, "the legislator of modern Europe,"' and the founder of a "profoundly
Christian" theory of international law,2 continues to animate discussions over
the application of natural law principles to questions of war and international
affairs in particular.
In his recent acclaimed work on the subject of war crimes, the philosopher
Larry May develops a "Grotian" humanitarian theory for dealing with the
problems of war and of war crimes in the twenty-first century.3 May identifies
Grotius as "one of the first to discuss international law in terms of international
humanitarian restraints. ' 4 The "Grotian account of the principle of humanity"
t Director of the Center for Theology and Law, and Associate Professor, Southern Baptist
Theological Seminary, Louisville, Kentucky. L.L.M., J.S.D., Yale University; J.D., University
of North Carolina; A.B., University of Michigan.
1. MICHEL VILLEY, LA FORMATION DE LA PENSIE JURIDIQUE MODERNE 597 (1968) (my
translation).
2. CHRISTOPH A. STUMPF, THE GROTAN THELOGY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: HUGO GRoTIUS
AND THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 9 (2006). Stumpf's work is
admirable for the unembarrassed clarity with which it links the strands of law and theology in
Grotius's writings. The reigning tendency among many international law and relations scholars
is to see the theological component in Grotius as so much discardable husk which, scraped
away, reveals the still-useful secularist kernel beneath. As we shall see, the idea of Grotius in
the minds of many turns out to look very like the projected image of modem skeptical
rationalism. Stumpf rejoins:
It is to be doubted whether such an interpretation of Grotius' theory of
international relations can dojustice to ajurist with such an immense theological
interest. The interpretation of Grotius as an ethical minimalist contrasts strongly
to Grotius' own dogmatic position in the theological controversies in the
Netherlands between the Remonstrants and the Counter-Remonstrants. Moreover,
it probably belies human nature to conceive of a scholar who is fully devoted to
proposing a return to the fundamental dogmatics of the church fathers in
elaborated theological treatises on one day, just to free himself of any such
theological preconditioning in order to display himself as the avant-garde of a
secular jurisprudence the next day.
Id. at 5.
3. LARRY MAY, WAR CRIMES AND JUST WAR (2007).
4. Id. at 33.
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animates May's project for "humane treatment, as the cornerstone of
international humanitarian law.",5 Grotius inspires a program of humane
treatment that transcends the corrective justice of "mere" retribution. Larry
May's account is rooted in a natural law understanding of the laws of war, an
understanding he derives, in significant part, from his reading of Hugo Grotius,
"surely [he says,] the most important figure to write on war in the last five
hundred years." 6
Other less favorable characterizations of the Grotian project have emerged in
recent decades. For Richard Tuck,7 in particular, Grotius is the "spring
swallow" that announces the coming high summer of early modem rights talk,8
the corrosive, skeptical, possessive individualism that emerges in the
subsequent works of Thomas Hobbes and others. In this view, as a "Hobbist
before Hobbes," Grotius holds much of the responsibility for the momentous
seventeenth-century turn from natural law, conceived as an objective account of
reality ordered according to divine ordinance, to natural rights, a view in which
theories about nature clear the ground for the rule of autonomous human
appetites. Among others still less sympathetic, the predominant view is that
Grotius marks the decisive break to a rationalist, secularist account of natural
law with a notorious five-word Latin phrase-for some, the only words for
which Grotius is either known or remembered. 9 There is no doubt that a
significant turn toward autonomous rationalism occurred in the seventeenth
century, or that it changed the subsequent direction of natural law thought. But
the better judgment of more recent scholarship has shown that the attribution of
this modem and rationalist turn to Grotius as initiator needs to be heavily
qualified.' °
In the interest of brevity, this article cannot begin to weigh in on these long-
standing debates. Rather, the purpose is to provide a brief summary of Grotius'
5. Id. at 298-99.
6. Id. at 28.
7. See, e.g., RICHARD TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES: THEIR ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT
(1979) (especially ch. 3, "Hugo Grotius"); THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE: POLITICAL THOUGHT
AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER FROM GROTius To KANT (1999).
8. The expression is borrowed from Oliver O'Donovan, The Justice of Assignment and
Subjective Rights in Grotius, in OLIVER O'DoNovAN & JOAN LOCKWOOD O'DoNOvAN, BONDS
OF IMPERFECTION: CHRISTIAN POLITCS, PAST AND PRESENT 167, 171 (2004) [hereinafter
O'Donovan, Justice ofAssignment]. O'Donovan's careful critique of Tuck's position provides
a valuable correction.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See, e.g., the account of the progress of this "secularization" thesis, in RENtE JEFFREY,
HUGO GROTIS IN INTERNATIONAL THOUGHT 33-37 (2006); see also O'Donovan, Justice of
Assignment, supra note 8, at 167-203.
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teaching on the natural law, the foundation for his development of a
comprehensive system of international law. The discussion will then turn to
suggest one possible contemporary application of that teaching. The article
begins with a short account of Grotius's life and circumstances, followed by an
outline of his treatment of natural law as developed in two major works, the
Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty, (1609),11 and The Laws of War
and Peace (1625).12 In the final section of the article, Grotius' natural law
teaching, it is hoped, will assist in evaluating one of the more contentious
contemporary questions of law and policy, the matter of the detention and trial
of unlawful enemy combatants-a question to which Larry May seeks to give a
"Grotian" treatment in the culminating chapter of his work on war crimes.
II. A TURBULENT LIFE AT THE BLOODY CROSSROADS BETWEEN LAW AND
THEOLOGY
The polymath "father of international law" was a theologian as well as
lawyer, politician, scholar and diplomat. Grotius was born in 1583, one
hundred years after the birth of Martin Luther, and died in 1645, three years
before the Peace of Westphalia brought a conclusion to the Thirty Year War
that ravaged the continent of Europe throughout much of his adult life.1
3
It was a momentous period in the life of his native Netherlands as well. The
Dutch people had recently thrown off the yoke of Spanish rule. The united
provinces had become a Republic in the year 1588, when Grotius was five
years old; his own family had been instrumental in the war for independence.'
4
The new constitutional order in the United Provinces was a form of
confederation in which Holland held political and cultural pre-eminence.15
11. HUGO GROTIUS, COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF PRIZE AND BOOTY (De Jure Praedae
Commentarius) (Martine Julia van Ittersum ed., 2006) [hereinafter, GROTuS, LAW OF PRIZE AND
BOOTY].
12. Huo GRorus, THE LAWS OF WAR AND PEACE (Richard Tuck ed., 2005). [hereinafter,
GROTIUs, LAWS OF WAR AND PEACE]. In this article, all citations to Grotius's work refer to this
Liberty Fund edition, which uses the 1738 English translation of Jean Barbeyrac's acclaimed
French edition. As commentators have remarked, all of the available English translations of
Grotius contain serious flaws.
13. C.G. Roelofsen provides a helpful, detailed narrative account of Grotius's life and
career as it unfolds within the context of politics, theological controversy and international
relations in 17th century Netherlands. C.G. Roelofsen, Grotius and the International Politics of
the 17th Century, in HEDLEY BULL, HuGo GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 95
(Benedict Kingsbury & Adam Roberts eds., 1990).
14. Richard Tuck, intro., in GROTIUS, LAWS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 12, at xii-xiii.
15. EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE LIFE AND LEGAL WRITINGS OF HUGO GROTUS 11(1969).
2008]
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From the standpoint of religious confession, the seat of Arminian theology
was a minority in the Calvinist Netherlands. Grotius and his colleagues feared
that a kind of confessional particularism, such as that represented by the Synod
of Dort (1618-1 9),16 threatened to push the provinces back under a new form of
tyranny. Grotius failed in his efforts to foster a minimalist confession that all
provinces in the Republic could abide.17 At the height of the Remonstrant
controversy, Grotius along with his patron was arrested and arraigned for
treason. 18 Grotius received a life sentence, and spent two years in prison at
Louvestein castle. He ended up reaching freedom through the efforts of his
courageous and resourceful wife. 19 An exile for much of the remainder of his
life, Grotius eventually landed in the court of Louis XIII and later managed to
serve for a period as the ambassador of Sweden in the French court.2° It was in
Paris that he composed the massive treatise for which he is most well known,
The Laws of War and Peace.
It is the aspect of his experience as a lawyer as well as legal theorist2' that
makes Grotius an interesting prospect for Protestants thinking about the natural
law. To be sure, Luther, Calvin and many other Protestant theologians of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries left important, occasional affirmations of
the natural law scattered throughout their writings and sermons-albeit unjustly
neglected and frequently misunderstood. By contrast, Grotius produced a
treatise outlining an international regime of law, systematized upon natural law
foundations, that continues to shape the world.22 Though many of his works
deal with the topic of natural law, his most mature and elaborate treatment
16. Id. at 12.
17. Richard Tuck, intro., in GROTiS, LAWS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 12, at xiii-xv.
18. Id.
19. Id. at xv.
20. Id.
21.
Un large secteur de la pensee juridique de l'Europe moderne trouve son origine
chez Grotius. Grotius est l'un des mdiateurs les plus efficaces que l'histoire ait
jamais connus entre une vision philosophique du monde et la science du droit.
Plus juriste que philosophe, sensible aux problmes de son temps, surtout
ambitieux de leur donner une solution pratique; mais un de ces juristes dagag~s
des routines professionnelles et pourvus d'une si large culture, si audacieux et
clairvoyant qu'ils sont capables de solutions neuves.
VILLEY, supra note 1, at 598.
22. "Certain fundamental facets underlying the Grotian systen-especially the doctrines of
legal equality, territorial sovereignty, and independence of states-remain cardinal principles of
international law today .... For all his contributions, Grotius is usually remembered as the
'father of international law."' CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 21ST
CENTURY: RULES FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 17 (2005).
[Vol. 2:881
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appears in the Laws of War and Peace.
Yet, the very comprehensive nature of the Grotian project renders it more
problematic from the standpoint of natural law. The historical context of
Grotius's writings is critical23-the experience of a series of devastating
religious wars prompted the search for a bedrock of consensus on which to lay
solid foundations for a durable peace. 4 As had been the case in the
Netherlands, the particularistic tenets of confessional religion had only
produced tensions and frictions that too frequently sparked the flames of
outright war. For better or worse, Grotius sought to pierce beneath the layers of
theological confessionalism to discover demonstrable, unassailable principles of
moral right25-principles which would furnish a natural law foundation for
regulating the conduct of war and peace.
Grotius indicated early the difficult moral conditions prompting him to write:
Now for my Part, being fully assured.., that there is some Right
common to all Nations, which takes place both in the Preparations
and in the Course of War, I had many and weighty Reasons
inducing me to write a Treatise upon it. I observed throughout the
Christian World a Licentiousness in regard to War, which even
barbarous Nations ought to be ashamed of: a Running to Arms
upon very frivolous or rather no Occasions; which being once taken
up, there remained no longer any Reverence for Right, either Divine
or Human, just as if from that Time Men were authorized and firmly
resolved to commit all manner of Crimes without Restraint.26
Yet in steering clear of the degrading idea that anything goes in war, there was
another danger to be avoided, one that arose from the opposite attraction of
condemning all war as unjust and illegitimate:
23. "[W]hile it would be an exaggeration to describe Grotius' interest in international law
as merely incidental to his role in Dutch and international politics, there would be rather more
truth in that than in the converse position, namely, of considering the 'sage of Delft' as the
impartial jurisconsult of mankind in accordance with his declaration in the Prolegomena." C.G.
Roelofsen, Grotius and the International Politics of the 17th Century, in BULL, supra note 13, at
95, 97-98.
24. The dilemma has been called "the Grotian problematic." Stephen Darwall, The
Foundations of Morality: Virtue, Law and Obligation, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO
EARLY MODERN PHILOSOPHY 221, 223 (Donald Rutherford ed., 2006) (quoting J.B.
SCHNEEwIND, THE INVENTION OF AUTONOMY: A HISTORY OF MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY
(1998)).
25. As Christoph Stumpf shows, this hardly made it an anti-theological work. See
generally STUMPF, supra note 2.
26. GROTIus, LAWS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 12, at 1:106.
2008]
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The Spectacle of which monstrous Barbarity worked many, and
those in no wise bad Men, up into an Opinion, that a Christian,
whose Duty consists principally in loving all Men without
Exception, ought not at all to bear Arms; [men such as Grotius'
countryman, Erasmus, for example]; Men that were great Lovers of
Peace both Ecclesiastical and Civil; but, I suppose, they had the
same View, as those have who in order to make Things that are
crooked straight, usually bend them as much the other Way. But
this very Endeavor of inclining too much to the opposite Extreme, is
so far from doing Good, that it often does Hurt, because Men readily
discovering Things that are urged too far by them, are apt to slight
their Authority in other Matters, which perhaps are more reasonable.
A Cure therefore was to be applied to both these, as well to prevent
believing that Nothing, as that all Things are lawful.27
The evidence of a tendency to move from worse to worse in war, all too
apparent even within the jurisdictions of Christendom, did not give cause for
resignation or despair. Rather, it provided the impetus for engaging in "the
proper business of Justice," securing effective means of resistance against the
kinds of "Temptations" that lead to the degradation of relations and outright
hostility among nations- "for the preserving of Human Society inviolable.,
28
Such means Grotius sought to find within the middle way between a jingoist
amorality in war, and pacifism.
In the Prolegomenon to the Laws of War and Peace, Grotius squared up
against the claim that war is a human activity that somehow falls outside the
boundaries delineated by the laws of nature. In its extreme form, the perennial
argument denied the very existence of a right (ius) of nature, unless it be the
instinctual law of "interest" that drives men to seek and snatch up whatever
they desire-the law of the passions. Grotius, significantly, identified the
position with the ancient radical skeptic philosopher, Cameades.
Laws (says he) were instituted by Men for the sake of Interest; and
hence it is that they are different, not only in different Countries,
according to the Diversity of their Manners, but often in the same
Country, according to the Times. As to that which is called
NATURAL RIGHT, it is a mere Chimera. Nature prompts all Men,
and in general all Animals to seek their own particular Advantage:
So that either there is no Justice at all, or if there is any, it is extreme
Folly, because it engages us to procure the Good of others, to our
27. Id. at 1:106.
28. Id. at 1:121.
[Vol. 2:881
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own Prejudice., 29
The integrity of the Grotian project rested on the premise that even in the
violent, bloody, chaotic activity of war itself, there exist universal, discernable
boundaries prescribed through the human recognition of what is fitting, right
and in accordance with the nature of beings created in the image of God. The
times required him to undertake the hazardous search for a principled mean that
would give due recognition to the legitimacy of just belligerent action, while
identifying sensible, defined limits upon the potent proclivities of interest.30
The quest required a forthright exposition of principle in the face of powerful
visceral attractions; "a base Thing ought not to be done, even for the Sake of
ones Country.",3' At the same time, it should not amount to the frustrating and
futile exercise of a perpetual cross-grained, upstream struggle against the deep
abiding current of interest. "Interest," (like "nature") it seemed, was
susceptible to a wider range of meanings than the simple condemnation or
commendation of interest-based arguments could acknowledge.
For as he that violates the Laws of his Country for the Sake of some
present Advantage to himself, thereby saps the Foundation of his
own perpetual Interest, and at the same Time that of his Posterity:
So that People which violate the Laws of Nature and Nations, break
down the Bulwarks of their future Happiness and Tranquillity.3
2
The good perceived in the recognition of interest was not, at its core,
incompatible with the good of the commonalty, expressed as community, nation
or world.33
29. Id. at 1:79.
30. Id. at 1:108-10. As Grotius put it in the earlier work, De Jure Praedae, "virtue, at both
extremes, borders on vice." GROTIUS, LAW OF PRIZE AND BOOTY, supra note 11, at 10.
31. GROTIUS, LAWS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 12, at 1:98-99.
32. Id. at 1:94-95; see also para. 9:
By reason that Man above all other Creatures is endued ... with Judgment to
discern Things pleasant or hurtful, and those not only present but future, and such
as may prove to be so in their Consequences; it must therefore be agreeable to
human Nature, that according to the Measure of our Understanding we should in
these Things follow the Dictates of a right and sound Judgment, and not be
corrupted by Fear, or the Allurements of present Pleasure, nor be carried away
violently by blind Passion. And whatsoever is contrary to such a Judgment is
likewise understood to be contrary to Natural Right, that is, the Laws of our
Nature.
Id. at 1:87.
33. As Grotius argued in the Prolegomenon to the Commentary on the Law of Prize and
Booty, there was a reciprocity, a process at work here that was "mutual and alternating."
2008]
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For Grotius, war and the decision to go to war, was a kind ofjuridical law-
enforcement procedure, undertaken for the purpose of securing a better, more
lasting peace:
... War is made against those who cannot be restrained in a judicial
Way. For judicial Proceedings are of Force against those who are
sensible of their Inability to oppose them; but against those who are
or think themselves of equal Strength, Wars are undertaken; but yet
certainly to render Wars just, they are to be waged with no less care
and Integrity than judicial Proceedings are usually carried on.34
These practical concerns relate back to Grotius's conception of natural right.
Given the stated scope of the project, he asks: How is it possible to prove that
something is of natural right? And: How does one determine the content of this
right order of things? Grotius framed his answer grounding natural law in
human sociability. To the charge that humans share this sociable quality with
many of the lower animals, Grotius elaborated:
Now amongst the Things peculiar to Man, is his Desire of Society,
that is, a certain Inclination to live with those of his own Kind, not
in any Manner whatever, but peaceably, and in a Community
regulated according to the best of his Understanding; which
Disposition the Stoicks termed "oikei6sis."
3
Thus, it is not correct to say that the comprehensive counsel of nature simply
leads men to fulfill the instinct for self-preservation alone. As Grotius
described it in his first major work on the subject of natural law, the
Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty, "men agree most emphatically
upon the proposition that it behoves us to have a care for the welfare of others;
for the acceptance of this obligation might almost be termed a distinguishing
characteristic of man." Indeed, this quality of "looking outwards" was the very
"starting point of justice. ''36
The mere non-rational satiation of immediate interest does not provide a
satisfactory account of human nature. Alongside the natural desire of society,
for the fulfilling of which humankind received the gift of speech-there is a
corresponding faculty of knowing and acting "according to some general
GROTIuS, LAW OF PRIZE AND BOOTY, supra note 11, at 29.
34. GRoTius, LAWS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 12, at 1:101-02.
35. Id. at 1:79-81.
36. GRoTrus, PRIZE AND BOOTY, supra note 11, at 26. Although Grotius cited classical
sources to establish the point, the obvious Biblical parallel in Christ's summary of the second
table of the law as love of neighbor, was clearly apparent.
[Vol. 2:881
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principles"-and what "relates to this Faculty" "properly and peculiarly agrees
to Mankind., 37  Human rationality, the capacity for knowing and acting
according to general principles, with the quality of sociability, form the
essential components of human nature. He restates in the following paragraph:
"this care of maintaining Society in a Manner conformable to the Light of
human Understanding"--this "is the Fountain of Right, properly so called. 38
The reasoning that accords with natural law proceeds "by Arguments drawn
from the very nature of [a] Thing," adducing that Thing's "necessary Fitness or
Unfitness ... with a reasonable and sociable Nature. 3 9 Working outward from
the basic principles of human nature, it is possible to discern right means of
action for attaining a particular kind of human community, as Grotius put it in
the Prolegomena to the first edition of the work, "not a community of any kind,
but one at peace, and with a rational order.' 4°  At its various levels of
aggregation, the created order seeks out a peace that consists in the right
ordering of relationships. 41
As examples of the care of maintaining society in the light of human
understanding, Grotius cited a non-exhaustive list, comprehending in large part
the commercial virtues of respect for property, honoring agreements, making
restitution for damages, and, most importantly for our purposes here, "the Merit
of Punishment among Men. ' 42 The point about punishment as a feature of the
natural human order requires some explanation.
Aristotle had introduced a two-fold distinction that had framed all
subsequent discussions of justice.43 The first distinction had to do with the
quality of justice as the sum of all the virtues, as "complete virtue or
excellence."' 4  The second distinction proceeded to examine two other
prevalent understandings ofjustice. The examples Grotius listed at this point in
37. GROTIUS, LAWS OF WAR AND PEACE supra note 12, at 1:85
38. Id. at 1:84-86.
39. Id. at 1:159.
40. Id. at3:1747.
41. Although Grotius clearly relies most heavily on the Stoics for demonstrating this
"exquisite Desire of society" (Id. at 1:84), here as elsewhere, there are clear echoes of
Augustine, who famously argued in Book xix of the City of God that all things seek out a kind
of peace, from the peace of the individual human body and soul, to the household, to cities and
nations, culminating in the perfect peace of the Heavenly city itself. AUGUSTiNE, THE CITY OF
GOD AGAINST THE PAGANS 938-39 (R.W. Dyson ed., 1998).
42. GROTIUS, LAWS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 12, at 1: 86. The examples carry over
the polemical thrust of the Commentary on Prize and Booty, written in part as a piece of
advocacy on behalf of the United Dutch East India Company.
43. ARISTOTLE, NIcoMAcHEAN EmIcs 111-16 (Martin Ostwald ed., 1999). My brief
summary here follows O'Donovan, Justice of Assignment, supra note 8, at 167-70.
44. ARISTOTLE, supra note 43, at 114.
2008]
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his argument correspond to the notion of justice in the "strict" sense, or
"compensatory justice," one variety within Aristotle's second distinction,
summarized in the classical formula "render unto each that which is his due"
(suum cuique tribuere) Grotius followed by appending another category of
justice, the second category within Aristotle's so-called second distinction, or
"distributive justice,"
to this belongs a prudent Management in the gratuitous Distribution
of Things that properly belong to each particular Person or Society,
so as to prefer sometimes one of greater before one of less Merit, a
Relation before a Stranger, a poor Man before one that is rich, and
that according as each Man's Actions, and the Nature of the Thing
require.46
As Oliver O'Donovan demonstrates, Grotius' realignment of the traditional
Aristotelian categories of commutative and distributive justice, modified in
Book I as "expletive" and "attributive" justice, respectively, marks one of the
most significant and helpful achievements of his theoretical project.47
It is at this stage of the argument that Grotius makes the claim to which so
much notoriety has attached. It is helpful to set the comment in its context:
And indeed, all we have now said would take place, though we
should grant, what without the greatest Wickedness cannot be
granted, that there is no God, (etsi daremus ... Deum non esse) or
that he takes no Care of human Affairs. The contrary of which
appearing to us, partly from Reason, partly from a perpetual
Tradition, which many Arguments and Miracles, attested by all
Ages, fully confirm; it hence follows, that God, as being our
Creator, and to whom we owe our Being, and all that we have,
ought to be obeyed by us in all Things without Exception, especially
since he has so many Ways shewn his infinite Goodness and
Almighty Power; whence we have Room to conclude that he is able
to bestow, upon those that obey him, the greatest Rewards, and
those eternal too, since he himself is eternal; and that he is willing so
to do ought even to be believed, especially if he has in express
Words promised it; as we Christians, convinced by undoubted
Testimonies, believe he has.
45. Id. at 120-23. Grotius elaborates and amends the two categories of Aristotle's second
distinction in Book I. See GRoT1us, LAWS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 12, at 1:136-54.
46. GRoTus, LAWS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 12, at 1:87-88.
47. O'Donovan, Justice of Assignment, supra note 8.
[Vol. 2:881
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And this now is another Original of Right, besides that of Nature,
being that which proceeds from the free Will of God, to which our
Understanding infallibly assures us, we ought to be subject: And
even the Law of Nature itself, whether it be that which consists in
the Maintenance of Society, or that which in a looser Sense is so
called, thought it flows from the internal Principles of Man, may
notwithstanding be justly ascribed to God, because it was his
Pleasure that these Principles should be in us. And in this Sense
Chrysippus and the Stoicks said, that the Original of Right is to be
derived from no other than Jupiter himself; from which Word
Jupiter it is probable the Latins gave it the Name Jus.
48
To the question of the meaning of "nature," given the central Christian
teaching of the Fall of Man, Grotius appended a pithy response in a footnote to
this passage, citing the 4th century church father Chrysostom, "'When I speak of
Nature,' says St. Chrysostom, on I Cor. Xi 3. 'I mean God; for he is the Author
of Nature. ' ' 49 To be sure, the statement hardly eliminates all the attendant
ambiguities. Nevertheless, it assists in lining up the overall thrust of Grotius's
intended meaning. He continued with another hint at the doctrine of the Fall
and its consequences:
There is yet this farther Reason for ascribing it to God, that God by
the Laws which he has given, has made these very Principles more
clear and evident, even to those who are less capable of strict
Reasoning, and has forbid us to give way to those impetuous
Passions, which, contrary to our own Interest, and that of others,
divert us from following the Rules of Reason and Nature; for as they
are exceedingly unruly, it was necessary to keep a strict Hand over
them, and to confine them within certain narrow Bounds.5 °
The context of the "etsi daremus" statement helps define Grotius's intention,
and adds weight to the settled understanding among his most careful readers:
Grotius introduces here what amounts to "a scholastic saw," 5' a statement that
had become a formulaic commonplace of scholastic argumentation in the late
middle Ages and early modem period.52 The reference to divine will in the
48. GROTIUS, LAWS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 12, at 1:89-91 (emphasis added).
49. Id at 91 n.2.
50. Id. at 91-92.
51. NORBERTO BoBBIO, THOMAS HOBBES AND THE NATURAL LAW TRADmON 153 (1993).
52. Despite continuing repetition of the contrary "saw" that views Grotius's "etsidaremus"
statement operating as the thin end of the wedge of atheistic rationalism, this conclusion is
shared by authors as diverse as VILLEY, supra note 1, at 612; JEFFREY, supra note 10, at 36-37;
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passage provides an important further clue. 53 Jeffrey cites the conclusion of
Vermeulen and Van Der Wal:
the impious hypothesis therefore had "nothing to do with a
secularisation of natural law ... [but] expresses that the content of
this law is not contingent, that it does not depend on arbitrary will-
not even on Divine Will-but consists of an immutable system of
rules with autonomous validity.,
54
Thus Grotius was being careful to distance himself from a radically voluntarist
view of law as the arbitrary expression of divine will, the view positing that
God could prohibit, say, murder at one point in time and then change his decree
to pronounce it good at some later point.55
O'Donovan, Justice of Assignment, supra note 8; JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL
RIGHTS 44 (1980) ("Grotius is standardly said to have inaugurated a new, modem and secular
era in natural law theorizing by his 'etiamsi daremus . . .' But this standard reading of Grotius
is a mere misunderstanding. Grotius must be assumed to have known (if only from his reading
of Suarez) that, for the purpose of discussing the roots of obligation, the hypothesis of God's
non-existence (or indifference) had been a commonplace of theological debate since, at the
latest, the mid-fourteenth century. And very many of the scholastics used the hypothesis to just
the same effect as Grotius. Nevertheless, for Finnis, at least, the fact does not obviate the
abiding connections in Grotius' thought to incipient 17th century rationalism and voluntarism.
53. The emphasis on the will of God as the source of natural law receives more extended
treatment in Book I. Thus, in further discussion of the law of nature as emanation of divine will,
Grotius continues,
As for the Rest, the Law of Nature is so unalterable, that God himself cannot
change it. For tho' the Power of God be infinite, yet we may say, that there are
some Things to which this infinite Power does not extend, because they cannot be
expressed by Propositions that contain any Sense, but manifestly imply a
Contradiction. For Instance then, as God himself cannot effect, that twice two
should not be four; so neither can he, that what is intrinsically evil should not be
Evil.
GRoTuS, LAWS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 12, at 1:155-6.
54. JEFFREY, supra note 10, at 37 (quoting B.P. Vermeulen and G.A. Van Der Wal, Grotius,
Aquinas and Hobbes: Grotian Natural Law Between Lex Aeterna and Natural Law, in
GROTIANA, 16/17:71 (1995-96).
55. A complex point is merely noted here at considerable risk of over-simplification.
Grotius was not setting out to write a work of scholastic theology. The point makes some sense
of a decision not to introduce elaborate discussions ofpotentia ordinata,potentia absoluta and
divine command theory into a preliminary introduction to natural law principles. For two
recent, more subtle descriptions of the issues surrounding the so-called "power distinction" in
late medieval and reformed scholasticism, see STEPHEN J. GRABILL, REDISCOVERING THE
NATURAL LAW IN REFORMED THEOLOGICAL ETHICS 54-69 (2006), and PAUL HELM, JOHN
CALVIN'S IDEAS 312-46 (2004).
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This being said, it must be added that the time was ripe for such an idea to
gain new traction. In a period of mounting despair and exhaustion from a
century of religious wars, Grotius was hardly the only early modem writer who
sought what was hoped would provide a more stable basis for ethics and law.
J.M. Kelly's pronouncement remains valid: the formula enunciated by the
celebrated Grotius, in the eyes of successors seeking just such an opening,
however qualified, was to be decisive in unhooking the doctrine of
natural law-in the ethical sense, not as a prudential derivative of
desire to cure a savage state of nature-from theology... Grotius's
famous formula... served to make harmless later essays in his own
century towards elaborating what he has been credited with
inaugurating, namely, an entirely secular natural law.
56
III. SOLIDARISMAND THE BoNDs OF LAW
Emphasizing a feature that is perhaps most clearly apparent on the relational
level of the family,17 Grotius argues that recognition of the reality of self-
regarding interest does not cause the idea of a law of human nature to collapse
into myopic solipsism. On the contrary, it is at this very point of identification
of the law of natural human interdependence that an opening emerges to
provide uplift to the powerful instinctual pull of self-interest. Thus Grotius
acknowledges the plain and obvious reality that human beings are not self-
sufficient. "But to the Law of Nature Profit (utilitas) is annexed: For the
Author of Nature was pleased, that every Man in particular should be weak of
himself, and in Want of many Things necessary for living commodiously, to the
56. J.M. KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY 226 (1992).
57. "The most natural Association is that of Marriage...." GROTIUS, LAWS OF WAR AND
PEACE, supra note 12, at 2:513-14. Families form the basic building blocks of natural order, on
the basis of which then, larger communities are formed and preserved. On this foundational
level, Grotius aligns with another important and under appreciated Protestant natural law
thinker, his contemporary, the northern German, Johannes Althusius. Like Althusius, Grotius
emphasizes the primacy of the family as the institution through which humankind lives out its
social nature. GROTIUS, LAWS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 12, at 2:508-45. The comment of
Oliver O'Donovan is apposite: "Grotius's recurrent instance of natural authority is the
paterfamilias." O'Donovan, The Justice of Assignment, supra note 8, at 185. Althusius coins
the term symbiosis as a way of capturing the relational quality of the natural human condition-
the first sentence of his magnum opus Politica (1610), discloses this symbiosis as the animating
principle of his political thought: "Politics is the art of associating men for the purpose of
establishing, cultivating and conserving social life among them." JOHANNES ALTHuSIUs,
POLITICA 17 (Fredrick S. Carney ed., 1995).
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End we might more eagerly affect Society., 58
It is this reticulated interconnectedness of human community, a
"solidarism ' '59 that forms the basis of political order and the justification and
validation-for states in Grotius' scheme. In this way, Grotius opened his three-
fold exposition of "Human Voluntary Right":
We will begin with the Human, as more generally known; and
this is either a Civil, a less extensive, or a more extensive Right than
the Civil. The Civil Right is that which results from the Civil
Power. The Civil Power is that which governs the State. The State
is a compleat Body of free persons, associated together to enjoy
peaceably their Rights, and for their common Benefit. The less
extensive Right, and which is not derived from the Civil Power,
though subject to it, is various, including in it the Commands of a
Father to his Child, of a Master to his Servant and the like. But the
more extensive Right, is the Right of Nations, which derives its
Authority from the Will of all, or at least of many, Nations. I say of
many, because there is scarce any Right found, except that of
Nature, which is also called the Right of Nations, common to all
Nations.60
The description denotes a stepped progression from familial relationships and
civil associations of various types, to the nation and then to the community of
nations. This structural order made sense of what would otherwise seem a
strange anomaly in a work on the law of war and peace: the extended treatment
of familial, household and other relationships (those falling in the category of
"less extensive right") in chapter five of Book two.61 As with Althusius, no one
combination within the network of interlocking relationships was independent
58. GRoTIus, LAWS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 12, at 1: 93-94; see also Althusius, in a
corresponding passage:
Truly, in living this life no man is self-sufficient (autarkies), or adequately
endowed by nature .... Nor in his adulthood is able to obtain in and by himself
those outward goods he needs for a comfortable and holy life, or to provide by his
own energies all the requirements of life. The energies and industry of many men
are expended to procure and supply these things. Therefore, as long as he remains
isolated and does not mingle in the society of men, he cannot live at all
comfortably and well while lacking so many necessary and useful things.
ALTHUSIUS, supra note 57, at 17-18.
59. I borrow the term coined by Hedley Bull, "solidarism" to express this idea, though Bull
uses the term in a slightly different sense than I am using it here. BULL, supra note 13, at 65, 87.
60. GROTIUS, LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 12, at 1:162-63.
61. Id. at 2:508-65.
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and self-sustaining. "Public peace" sustained and "comprehended that also of
every particular Person;" while "the Happiness of the Prince depends on the
Happiness of his Subjects., 62
It was on the basis of this acknowledged human interdependence that the
lawfulness of belligerent action on behalf of others in need was to be grounded
and justified.
But it is not only lawful for us, as far as we are able, to be beneficial
to another, but also commendable. They who write of Offices,
justly say that there is nothing so useful to one Man, as another
Man. Now there are several particular Ties, which engage Men
mutually to assist each other. Kinsmen assemble to help one
another: Neighbors and Fellow-Citizens call for the Aid one of the
other .... But tho' there were no other Obligations, it is enough
that we are allied by a common Humanity. For every Man ought to
interest himself in what regards other Men .... 63
Even at the international level, a similar interdependence prevails, Grotius
argues:
there is no State so strong or well provided, but what may
sometimes stand in need of Foreign Assistance, either in the
Business of Commerce, or to repel the joint Forces of several
Foreign Nations Confederate against it. For which Reason we see
Alliances desired by the most powerful Nations and Princes, the
whole Force of which is destroyed by those that confine Right
within the Limits of each State. So true is it, that the Moment we
recede from Right, we can depend upon nothing.64
It was the hierarchical ordering of interdependent relationships that identified
roles, rights and responsibilities after the manner of parts ordered to the
whole.65
62. Id. at 1:345.
63. Id. at 1:384.
64. Id. at 1:97. Such seventeenth-century observations "provide the seeds for contemporary
discussions of humanitarian intervention, which likewise emphasizes securing justice as a
natural right." Richard B. Miller, Christian Attitudes toward Boundaries: Metaphysical and
Geographical, in CHRISTIAN POLITICAL ETcs 67, 84 (John A. Coleman ed., 2008).
65. GRoTIus, LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 12, at 1:386. The notion forms an
important theme within Grotius's Prolegomena to the earlier Commentary on Prize and Booty-
carrying on to shape the entire work as well as the Laws of War and Peace. GROTIUS, LAW OF
PRIZE AND BOOTY, supra note 11, at 19-50.
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This Stoic principle of "oikei6sis" and which I am calling "solidarism," here
frames the Grotian conception of natural law, and points to an important
difference in the way that international law is increasingly understood currently,
and in particular, in recent debates over the treatment of enemy combatants.
What we see going on in our day is a hollowing of the intermediate space that
traditionally existed between the solitary individual and the relative abstraction
of "the international community"-so that individuals are now increasingly
seen to be the subjects of international law, to a degree and extent that Grotius
and the other natural law thinkers never recognized.66
Of course, this is not to say that Grotius failed to see the importance of the
individual. But to leave the thread of argument there is to neglect the
importance Grotius gives to the intermediate networks of relationship that
mediate between individual and the conglomerate mass. Of course, the most
important intermediate aggregation for Grotius in his treatment of the law of
war and peace was the nation-state. It was the peace treaty of 1648
inaugurating the so-called "Westphalian System" that gave prominent place to
the modem nation-state in the maintenance of international order. It has
become something of a clich6 that with the rise of globalism, mankind enters a
new "post-Westphalian" order that tolls the demise of the nation-state.67 But
such a prognosis fails to account for the legitimate and indispensable role of
states in maintaining international order and security. As Michael Ignatieff
observes,
In the western antiwar tradition, we are so used to thinking of the
state as an agent of violence, as the instigator of war, that we forget
the state's other historical role in our own development, which was
to confiscate weaponry from the militias and retinues of the
medieval warrior barons and to secure to a single authority the
monopoly over the legitimate use of force. However paradoxical it
may sound, the police and the armies of the nation-state remain the
only available institutions we have ever developed with the capacity
to control and channel large-scale human violence.68
IV. UNLAWFUL ENEMY COMBATANTS: A "NEO-CON" INVENTION?
66. See JEREMY RABKIN, LAW WITHOUT NATIONS? WHY CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT
REQUIRES SOVEREIGN STATES 158-92 (2005).
67. A. Claire Cutler, Critical Reflections on the Westphalian Assumptions ofInternational
Law and Organization: A Crisis of Legitimacy, 27 REV. OF INT'L STUDIES 133-50 (2001).
68. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE WARRIOR'S HONOR: ETHNIC WAR AND THE MODERN
CONSCIENCE 160 (1997).
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The prominence Grotius gives to "solidarism" in his natural law account of
the foundations of international law renders all the more striking his treatment
of a particularly thorny problem in the seventeenth century, the problem posed
by pirates and marauders, those who do not act as representatives of any nation
but who operate in a kind of nebulous, sub-national and transnational nether
region. The problem resurfaces again, in a different form, with international
terrorism. What, then, is to be done with such people?
The response of international law, as articulated by Grotius in the
seventeenth century-though hardly invented by him-and reiterated in later
formulations, was that such actors were outlaws, and enemies of all humankind
(hostis humani generis). As the standard texts explain, this is still the case in
international law today, and thus, "Piracy jure gentium (under the law of
nations) is the first international crime warranting universal jurisdiction, a
concept that permits any state to bring a pirate to justice at any time,
anywhere. '69
At initial glance, the idea of an expanded range of punishment options for a
particular type of combatant seems to cut against the grain of the theme of
solidarism that is so important to Grotius's account. In identifying a class of
persons who remain outside "the mutual tie of kinship among men" does this
aspect of the Grotian system disclose a lapse of coherence? Is it perhaps a
regrettable residue of illiberal primitivism? This seems to be the implication of
Larry May's argument. In the final chapter of his work on war crimes, May
seeks to apply "Grotian" humanitarian principles to the question of how
terrorists ought to be treated. Despite the argument that such actors were
subject to private punitive action, May urges, Grotius exercised commendable
judicial caution in finally giving advice on how to deal with pirates. These
drastic private measures were to be a rare occurrence in cases of necessity.
7 °
Surely, the exhortation to "Grotian" judiciousness is unimpeachable. Yet,
May ultimately argues for more than a generalized prudential circumspection.
The overarching humanitarian principle controls. Thus, merely "legalistic"
attempts to make distinctions between lawful combatants and unlawful
combatants, i.e., terrorists, neglects the higher approach rooted in "honor and
conscience." The choice, lying before those authorized to make such decisions,
is given in terms of either: a) the "unrestrained" view that because they are
"somehow 'illegal,"' terrorists "can be assaulted and otherwise abused with
impunity;', 71 or, b) terrorists deserve the same humane treatment across the
board as any other combatants on the battlefield--"terrorists, like everyone
69. JOYNER, supra note 22, at 137.
70. MAY, supra note 3, at 301-23.
71. Id. at 315.
2008]
HeinOnline -- 2 Liberty U. L. Rev. 897 2007-2008
LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
else, are owed a minimum amount of compassion, mercy, and justice, at least
procedural justice as epitomized in rule of law considerations., 72 If these are
the options, little question remains as to the outcome. May concludes that
"teriorists who are imprisoned are no less human and vulnerable than non-
terrorists. Terrorists should be treated humanely for their own sake but also, at
least as importantly for the sake of the soldiers who have to treat them.
7 3
Anything less promotes a degradation of the humanity of the captives, those
who are "just fellow humans, 74 along with a degradation of the humanity of
their captors. As stated in the abstract, of course, these proposals, seem hardly
controversial. Yet the question must be asked: Is this an accurate way of
setting up the problem? (If it is, one wonders, why there should be any
controversy on the topic?) Moreover, taking the matter out of the realm of
abstraction to fold in the consequences that are likely to follow upon its full-
bodied application, a further question presents itself: Is the proposed solution
truly humane?
In an early chapter of the City of God, Augustine makes a rather
controversial, much quoted, and perhaps cynical remark to the effect that
nations are merely bands of brigands writ large.75 A small group of thieves
comes together, controlling a limited area of turf, and it is called a gang. If the
same group of thieves gains control over a much larger area and over an entire
people, it becomes an empire.76 Grotius lodges his disagreement early on in the
work: "If there is no Community which can be preserved without some sort of
Right"--Plato and Cicero make it clear that this is true even in the
"remarkable" case of thieves and pirates-then "certainly the Society of
Mankind, or of several Nations, cannot be without it."'77 Right serves as an
indispensable ordering principle of communities all the way down from the
community of nations even, in a qualified sense, in the instance of those who
are organized for the sake of wrongdoing.
But this does not nullify the perduring distinctions that must be made
between gangs and nations. In the course of an important discussion of the
nature of sovereignty, Grotius expands on the argument opened in the prologue:
"A state does not immediately cease to be a state, if it commits some acts of
injustice, even by publick Deliberation; nor is a company of pirates and robbers
to be reputed a State-'tho perhaps they may observe some kind of Equity
72. Id. at 312.
73. Id. at 318.
74. Id. at 322.
75. AUGUSTNE, supra note 41, at 147-48.
76. Id.
77. GRoTIus, LAWS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 12, at 1:98.
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among themselves, without which no Body"--no human assemblage of any
type--"can long subsist. s7 8 An important difference remains, consisting not
primarily as a matter of order vs. lack of order; or even as justice vs. injustice,
per se. The difference, Grotius argues, is in the purpose, the end for which
these societies exist. Robbers and pirates are associated, he says, "on account
of their crimes"-nations, on the other hand, "tho' sometimes not wholly
guiltless, do associate for the peaceable enjoyment of their own rights, and to
do right to foreigners, if not in all things according to the law of nature, which.
.among many Nations, is in part forgotten ... ."79 Thus, a people's ability to
suppress the natural law to greater or lesser degree was not tantamount to an
argument for that law's ultimate illegitimacy or lack of value. Realism required
the candid acknowledgment that the law of nature, as borne out in the practices
of nations, "is in part forgotten." But this was not to eliminate its value as a
standard to which nations could be held to account. Nor did such failings
remove a people from the community of nations and push it over to the
category of pirates and brigands. "A sick body is yet a body.,80
At the same time, the fact that even criminals in their associations with one
another observed a rudimentary kind of equity-i.e., in the simple capacity for
functioning as a going concern--"without which no Body can long subsist,"
gave the lie to the cynical contention that the natural law is an ultimately
meaningless, because infinitely malleable abstraction. Such criminal
associations honored the natural law even as they organized for the sake of
violating it.sl Nevertheless, the distinction made a difference; "those who are
confederated in order to do mischief' are not to be accorded the identical
panoply of rights and privileges as nations and their lawful constituents. It is at
this point that it is critical to keep in mind an important doctrinal feature of the
Grotian system, the natural law basis for punishment. In the earlier work on the
Christian doctrine of the atonement, The Satisfaction of Christ, Grotius
remarks, "anyone may kill an outlaw, 8 2 referring to his teaching on a primitive
78. Id. at 3:1247.
79. Id. at 3:1247-48.
80. Id. at3:1249.
81. Similarly, J. Budziszewski responds to the commonplace objection that the regularity of
empirical evidence of grave moral wrongdoing undermines arguments for natural law:
Evil has been done in the name of every good; lies have been propounded in the
name of every truth. That is how sin works. Having nothing in itself by which to
convince, on what other resources but good and truth can it draw to make itself
attractive and plausible? We must use the natural law to recognize the abuse of
the natural law; there is nothing else to use.
J. BuDzIszEwsI, WHAT WE CAN'T NOT KNow: A GUIDE 109 (2003).
82. GROTTUS, THE SATISFACTION OF CHmIST (1617) [hereinafter GROTIUS, THE SATISFACION
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natural right of punishment that pre-exists the formation of civil society, a
doctrine that first appears in the Commentary on Prize and Booty, and receives
further elaboration in the Laws of War and Peace. On this account, it is
everyone's "natural right to revenge himself; and therefore were Hands given
us.''s3 As Grotius stated it, a transfer of the primitive power of punishment
assisted in furnishing the consensus that led to the origination of governments:
Is not the power to punish essentially a power that pertains to the
state? Not at all! On the contrary, just as the right of the magistrate
comes to him from the state, so has the same right come to the state
from private individuals . . . Therefore, since no one is able to
transfer a thing that he never possessed, it is evident that the right of
chastisement was held by private persons before it was held by the
state. ...
It is on this point that Grotius receives criticism for his focus on the self-
interested, individual subjective bearer of rights as the essential element in the
social composition. The original right of enforcement extrapolated out to
nation-states in the international arena justifies the right to use of force. There
emerges a prospect in which nations are seen to act just as individuals in the
nasty and brutish conditions of the state of nature that presides in the anarchic
international arena. 5
OF CHRIST], excerpted in FROM IRENAEUS TO GROTIUS: A SOURCEBOOK IN CHRISTIAN POLITICAL
THOUGHT 816 (Oliver O'Donovan & Joan Lockwood O'Donovan eds., 1999) [hereinafter FROM
IRENAEUS TO GROTIuS].
83. GROTiuS, LAWS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 12, at 1:384.
84. GROTIUS, LAW OF PRIZE AND BOOTY, supra note 11, at 136-37. Significantly, for
Grotius the clinching biblical text providing support for this primitive right of punishment was
found in the pre-Mosaic Noahic covenant of Genesis 9: "Who sheddeth man's blood, by man
shall his blood be shed." Id. at 135.
This is not a formulation of the lex talionis as a determination of penalty; it is,
rather, an expression of the basis of retributive practice itself. We are all mortal,
and our life has a limited expectancy. That fact gives all crime and all punishment
its meaning.... Every serious injury is an assault, directly or indirectly, on the
victim's life; so every punishment, too, is an assault on the offender's life.
OLIVER O'DONOVAN, THE WAYS OF JUDGMENT 122 (2005) [hereinafter O'DONOvAN, THE WAYS
OF JuDGMENT].
85.
Having taken this view of punishment, Grotius was committed to a much more
individualistic theory of the state than any of his Protestant contemporaries. The
rights enjoyed by atomic individuals in the Grotian state of nature filled out the
moral world: the state possessed no rights which those individuals had not
formerly possessed, and it was the same kind of moral entity as them.
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A complete response to the question of the magnitude of Grotius's deviation
from an Aristotelian account ofjustice would extend us far beyond the scope of
this article. It is sufficient for our purposes to register Oliver O'Donovan's
helpful corrective insight, in calling into question Tuck's characterization of the
negligible quality of community in the Grotian natural society. To the question,
how far did the Grotian principle of sociability extend? O'Donovan answers:
[Q]uite far. Natural society foreshadows civil society .... Nature..
leaves the subject of the right to punish indeterminate, but
indicates that "most appropriately" it is a superior, which is to say, it
anticipates a structured social context in which representative
authority arises. (Grotius's recurrent instance of natural authority is
the paterfamilias.) Punishment can never be administered by one
human being on another without some social utility in view, and can
never be undertaken for the sake of simple retaliation alone. The
substantive account of punishment places it wholly within the
context of responsible government. The point of rooting it in nature
is not to belittle the sociality of pre-civil society (which includes the
relations of sovereign states) but to magnify it, showing, as Grotius
is always concerned to do, that the whole content of civil
jurisprudence derives from the natural terms on which human
beings relate to one another.8 6
O'Donovan's rehabilitation of Grotius, if accurate, connects the teaching on
punishment to the central theme of solidarism, which as we have seen, forms
the core of Grotius's account of natural right. The organic metaphor of society,
common among Christian political thinkers, 7  as Grotius himself
acknowledged, 8 provided the context for making sense of the seemingly drastic
quality of the proposed remedy. It must be candidly admitted that it also
exposed one of the more illiberal elements of Grotius' teaching.
When the theologians inquire into the origins of punishments, they
avail themselves of an argument based upon comparison, as follows:
TUCK, supra note 7, at 63.
86. O'Donovan, Justice of Assignment, supra note 8, at 185.
87. Thus, John of Salisbury spoke of the need to cut off rotten members of the body
politic--"if they give offence to... public security,. . . they are to be destroyed utterly so that
the security of the corporate community may be procured by the extermination of the one
member;" such drastic curative measures become necessary "when the well-being of the entire
soul is in jeopardy." John of Salibury, Policraticus, in FROM IRENAEUS TO GROTIUS, supra note
82, at 292.
88. GROTIUs, LAW OF PRIZE AND BOOTY, supra note 11, at 31.
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all less worthy creatures are destined for the use of the most worthy;
thus, despite the fact that the beasts were indeed created by God, it
is nevertheless right that man should slay them, either in order to
convert them to use as his own property, or in order to destroy them
as harmful, both of these purposes being mentioned in the Scriptural
passage to which I have referred [i.e., Genesis ix. 6: "Whoso
sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed."]; similarly,
so the theologians contend, men of deplorable wickedness, for the
very reason that they are of such a character-stripped, as it were, of
all likeness to God or humanity-are thrust down into a lower order
and assigned to the service of the virtuous, changing in a sense from
persons into things, a process which constitutes the origin of slavery
in the natural order, too; and therefore, it is permissible to destroy
such men, either in order that they may be prevented from doing
harm or in order that they may be useful as examples.
89
Larry May's contention as to the higher priority of the general principle, over
against particular applications, is a sound reading of Grotius. It aligns with
how Grotius stated his own method: "[F]irst, let us see what is true universally
and as a general proposition; then, let us gradually narrow this generalization,
adapting it to the special nature of the case under consideration." 90 For Grotius
recognized that the greater the level of particularity of application, the greater
the corresponding movement from first principles of natural law to matters of
prudential judgment, the outcomes of which are seen to vary according to time
and circumstance. 91
Here, the controlling principle was to be found not at the abstract level of a
vague "humanitarian principle" but in the nature of punishment as an
outworking of "natural [solidarist] terms on which human beings relate to one
another .... , 92 In the Prolegomenon to the same work, Grotius introduced the
various forms of punishment, including, most importantly, "chastisement" and
"exemplary punishment." 93 "The first kind of punishment has as its aim the
correction of one individual; the second kind is aimed at the correction of all
other persons, in addition to that one. The attainment of these two objectives
89. Id. at 135.
90. Id. at 17.
91. The point came across as Grotius's main subject of argument unfolded in the
COMMENTARY; the laws regarding prize and booty needed to be assessed carefully, for one's
interpretation of that body of law could vary substantially according to the level of abstraction at
which one approached and sought to apply it. Id. at 207.
92. Id.
93. GRomIs, LAW OF PRIZE AND BOOTY, supra note 11, at 31.
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leads to a third: universal security., 94 These ends of punishment coincided "to
such an extent, indeed, that even capital punishment ... is in a sense beneficial
to the guilty parties, whenever there is no other remedy for their incurably
diseased spirits. 95 Even in this extreme case, then, it remained true as Plato
had said that "'No legal punishment has evil as its aim."' 96 In the more
extended treatment of the subject of punishment, in Book two of the Laws of
War andPeace,97 the intransigence of human sin meant that the "humanitarian"
approach, represented for instance by those Christians who would argue for
abolishing capital punishment, finally could not be sustained. The persistent
"general corruption and depravity of mankind".-"even since the Times of the
Gospel"-required the ongoing administration of the death penalty, as "the
Doctrine of the Apostle [Paul]" confirmed. 98
The essence of these arguments lies not in the direction of legitimizing
slavery or in the crude degradation "from persons into things" but in the
solidarist emphasis on the organic, interdependent character of human society.
The common good, and "universal security," not the private lust for vengeance,
controlled the punishment of the outlaw, identified its underlying purpose, and
justified its application in the specific case.
It sometimes happens, however, that things properly pertaining to
the parts tend to affect the whole, even though they are not directed
toward the whole as such. In these circumstances, one must weigh,
not the merits of persons, but the value of the things or the force of
the actions involved. This is the basis of rewards and punishments.
For the whole world should be grateful to him who has bestowed a
universal benefit. The devisers of useful inventions, for example,
have received praise and honour from all mankind. Conversely,
those persons who have inflicted universal injury, no less than those
who have injured a single individual ought to give proportionate
satisfaction. In a sense, however, an injury inflicted even upon one
individual is the concern of all, and this is true primarily because of
the example set; just as it is the concern of the whole body that its
various members should be sound, particularly as a guard against
94. Id. at 32.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 31-32.
97. See GROTTus, LAWS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 12, at 3:949-1052.
98. Thus, Grotius candidly observed that "the Death of some" afforded the means of
restraining "the Audaciousness of others." Id. at 3:986.
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contagion.9
Grotius was wrestling with the reconfiguration of the categories ofjustice that
would eventually take form in the Rights of War and Peace. "In almost any
context, he believes, the two types of justice [i.e., what he eventually calls
"expletive" and "attributive"] must be coordinated."' ° The compensatory
activity of punishment must be flexibly indexed to the larger context-fixation
upon the binary pairing, perpetrator-victim, or defendant-plaintiff, the parts at
the expense of the whole, would yield distortion and injustice.
In the justice of war... "mere expletive justice" is always a bad
guide. Consideration of rights must be supplemented with
consideration of prudence, the need of populations for peace and
welfare. Yet expletive justice may not simply be overridden; it is
not sufficient but it is necessary, and attributive justice is secondary
to the satisfaction of its demands.' '
The durability of organic human society depended on the resilience of the
natural ties connecting men with one another in communal bonds of society.
The just rendering of judgment must not fail to register this dynamic
assessment of "the value of things or the force of actions involved.'
0 2
Recognition of these abiding tensions allowed for the resolution of an
apparent paradox. The resolution was found at the point of balanced, rightly
tuned modulation between the interests of individual and community:
Now it may seem strange, inasmuch as punishment is hurtful to the
person on whom it is inflicted, that justice, which is motivated by
solicitude for all, should be directed to the harm of any individual.
In order to throw light on this point, it may be observed that no art
ever sets up evil as its ultimate goal, and that nevertheless there are
times when an art makes use of evil-though only in cases of
necessity-as an intermediate measure without which good cannot
be attained. Doctors will never inflict pain upon the sick, unless
considerations of health demand that they do so; nor will they
amputate any part of the body, save in the interest of the body as a
whole. Thus pain and mutilation, originally evil in themselves, may
assume the quality of goodness because they lead to a good greater
99. GROTIUS, LAW OF PRIZE AND BOOTY, supra note 11, at 30.
100. O'DONOVAN, WAYS OF JUDGMENT, supra note 84, at 39.
101. Id.
102. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
[Vo1. 2:881
HeinOnline -- 2 Liberty U. L. Rev. 904 2007-2008
HUGO GROTIUS. NATURAL LA WIN WAR
than the one to which as evils they were diametrically opposed. 0 3
On the question of punishment, the medical metaphor indicated the frequency
and severity of treatment was to be apportioned to the seriousness of the
disease. In their deliberate violation of an essential element of the natural law,
marauders who would deliberately "inflict a universal injury" in wrecking the
ties of common humanity sought to undo the very thing on which all-
civilization, law, peace, prosperity-depended. Their violent and destructive
self-removal from the reticulated framework of civil society rendered them
subject to severe punishment, for the sake of "that common good toward which,
as we have said, all punishments are directed in nature's plan."''04 Thus,
Grotius threaded the two arguments together. The basis for just punishment
was discovered in solidarism: "the right of punishment is not for the sake of
the one who punishes, but for the sake of some community. For all punishment
aims at the common good, and particularly at the preservation of order and
deterrence."1
05
Ultimately, the argument for a wider range of punishment options in the case
of hosti humani generis was not meant as a justification for torture, for
punishment was to be administered according to "that most sacred of natural
precepts which declares that man must not be prodigally misused by his fellow
man. ' I 6 Rather it was an argument that sought to limit, and contain, the
violence that occurs in war. On this basis, the laws of armed conflict have
always sought to preserve the basic distinction between lawful and unlawful
combatants.
As international legal specialists regularly observe, the laws of armed
conflict seek to structure proper, desirable incentives into the practices of
nations and peoples. The very existence of a law of armed conflict arises out of
the recognition and expectation that people will tend to order their behavior and
practice to accord with what the law allows or disallows. The projection of a
"Grotian" principle of humaneness that would seek to lift the level of treatment
afforded to all captive combatants, regular or irregular, quite transparently
seeks to influence the conduct of nations in their treatment of combatants. It
ignores the influence that such measures will have upon the practices of those
who may one day become the subjects of such treatment. For all its purported
humaneness, the obliteration of long-standing distinctions on combatant
identification unwittingly sets in motion a counter-productive, even perverse set
103. GROTIUS, LAW OF PRIZE AND BOOTY, supra note 11, at 30-31.
104. Id. at 139.
105. GROTIUs, SATISFACTION OF CHRIST, supra note 82, at 820.
106. GROTIUS, LAW OF PRIZE AND BOOTY, supra note 11, at 162.
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of incentives. If no serious penalties attach to the violation of standards
established for determining regular combatant status, at least some combatants
will see no reason to adhere to such standards. Indeed, the recognition that
equal treatment will be required as a matter of law in the event of capture and
detention will tend to foster the corresponding recognition that lawless methods
and means provide an excellent device for attaining asymmetric advantage over
one's declared enemies in war.'0 7 Consider now a combatant, simply wearing
cut off jeans and tee-shirt-without any apparent accountability to properly
recognized authority, and offering no way of identifying him as such. If such a
person uses deadly force and may still receive all the protections afforded to
regular combatants as a matter of international law, then there is every
likelihood that conflicts will escalate, and spread with greater rapidity to affect
innocent civilians.
Yet the limitation of violence and the reduction of collateral damage are two
of the most important reasons for making the attempt to regulate armed conflict
in the first place. These reasons formed the framework for a law among nations
that would be responsive to the interdependent character of human community,
for they recognized the important place of innumerable, voiceless third parties,
non-combatant civilians who would not particularly represent the prosecution
or the defense in a putative international criminal justice action. Indeed, this
Grotian principle of solidarism, with its focus on the reticulated ordering of
communities and the responsibilities of states for maintaining such order,
exposes the dangers of our singular contemporary fixation upon individual
offenses against the laws of war. By isolating individual cases in the manner of
domestic criminal adjudication, the international law system erodes the
intermediate structures of order that remain so critical to the preservation and
maintenance of that very system. It would also risk moving the spotlight of the
law's protections away from innocent noncombatant civilian populations and
on to the individual recipients of "international criminal justice." In 1943,
George Orwell warned that this kind of domestication of international affairs
ran the danger of producing further ugly and undesirable evidences of the law
of unintended consequences. °8 What our current experts in international
relations and law aspire to establish, Orwell strongly discouraged: ".... above
all, no solemn hypocritical 'trial of war criminals,' with all the slow cruel
pageantry of the law, which after a lapse of time has so strange a way of
107. Jefferson D. Reynolds, Collateral Damage on the 21st Century Battlefield: Enemy
Exploitation of the Law ofA rmed Conflict, and the Strugglefor a Moral High Ground, 56 A.F.
L. REV. 1 (2005).
108. George Orwell, Who are the War Criminals?, in 2 THE COLLECTED ESSAYS,
JOURNALisM AND LETrERS OF GEORGE ORWELL 319 (Sonia Orwell & Ian Angus eds., 1955).
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focusing a romantic light on the accused and turning a scoundrel into a hero." 109
As Alan Dershowitz recently argued, the suppression and denial of the basic
filaments of the fabric of natural law, i.e., that life is better than death, that the
good is to be pursued and evil to be avoided, forces new and difficult questions
on the nations of the west who are primary targets of Jihadist hatred:
Combatants can easily be distinguished from noncombatants. Has
[the Lebanese mother who exhorts her son to become a suicide
bomber in effect] "become a combatant ... ? Have the religious
leaders who preach a culture of death lost their status as
noncombatants? What about "civilians" who willingly allow
themselves to be used as human shields? Or their homes as
launching pads for terrorist rockets? The traditional sharp
distinction between soldiers in uniform and civilians in nonmilitary
garb has given way to a continuum. At the more civilian end are
babies and true noncombatants; at the more military end are the
religious leaders who incite mass murder; in the middle are ordinary
citizens who facilitate, finance or encourage terrorism. There are no
hard and fast lines of demarcation, and mistakes are inevitable-as
the terrorists well understand.110
Much of the confusion and the turmoil that has been stirring over
Guantanamo and over the treatment of unlawful enemy combatants has come
about because contemporary discourse in international law is now impoverished
and stripped of the natural law underpinnings of that body of law, as articulated
in the works of natural law thinkers like Grotius. Or rather, it has exploded one
subset of its principles out of proportion to the prudential ordering that made
such protective measures even viable. Grotius sought to establish that the
fabric of an international law that binds the nations in a loose kind of
community, held together by the strong fibers of the natural law. This natural
law fabric was woven with the threads of our rational social nature, with the
recognition that the human capacity for sustaining a just order among nations
depends in significant part upon the same kinds of qualities that make for
friendships, "which Nations, as well as private Persons stand in need of upon
many Occasions.""' Following this same line of analogy, Grotius could see as
a matter of common sense what many modem-day champions of international
human rights acknowledge only with disordered selectivity, that is, that "no
Man readily associates with those who have Justice, Equity and Fidelity in
109. Id. at 325.
110. Alan Dershowitz, Worshippers of Death, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 2008, at A17.
111. GRoTrus, LAWS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 12, at 1:105.
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Contempt."" 
2
V. CONCLUSION
Whether the legacy of Grotius itself represented a subtle degradation and
impoverishment of that natural law tradition, remains a question that cannot be
resolved in this limited space. On the more particular and immediate question
of "unlawful enemy combatants," this much remains clear. Grotius sought out
a workable mean that would lift the treatment of such questions on to the level
of decency and justice, while candidly acknowledging the requirement for
unflinching severity in confronting severe and implacable threats.
[L]et us not imagine that to be vicious which is devoid of vice; and
let us not be unjust to ourselves while shunning injustice toward
others. The weapon that flies far past the target, misses the mark no
less than the weapon that falls short of its aim. Both extremes are
blameworthy; both are tainted by error .... Justice consists in
taking a middle course. It is wrong to inflict injury, but it is also
wrong to endure injury. The former is, of course, the graver
misdeed, but the latter is also to be avoided."
13
It is finally incorrect to frame the options in terms of a simple either/or
proposition: either afford to terrorists all the rights and privileges given to
those who adhere to the laws of war-as if they were fully integrated members
of the communities of peoples; or descend into an ever-coarsening bestial
cruelty. Those who would destroy the very basis for the existence of
international law-its respect for life, and for the communities that make it
possible to sustain that life-force difficult moral choices upon those whom
they seek to kill; it is a simple truth. All the more reason, for the sake of the
innocent, for the sake of the continuation of decent civilization, that
discernment and clarity characterize the response. In his natural law teaching
Grotius demonstrated the balanced discipline we seek.
112. Id. at 1:105-06.
113. GRoTIUS, LAW OF PRIZE AND BOOTY, supra note 11, at 11-12.
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